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I. INTRODUCTION  
Whither formalities in copyright law? In 1989, the United States removed 
formal requirements for obtaining copyright protection within its borders1 so 
that the United States could become party to the Berne Convention for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.2 Authors’ rights triumphalists in 
 
  © 2013 Michael W. Carroll. This Article is licensed under a Creative Commons 
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 †  Professor of Law and Director, Program on Information Justice and Intellectual 
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insights and to Alan deLevie and Alexandra El-Bayeh for research assistance. 
 1. See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 
2853 (1988) (amending a number of sections of Title 17, United States Code, to remove 
requirements of placing copyright notice on published copies, depositing a copy, and 
registering a claim to copyright prior to commencing suit for infringement).  
 2. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, July 24, 1971, 
25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention]. All citations to the Berne 
Convention are to the “Paris Act,” adopted on July 24, 1971, and to which the United States 
acceded on March 1, 1989, supra note 1, unless noted otherwise. 
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certain quarters greeted this decision as an important step forward.3 The 
United States prospectively abandoned its longstanding policy of 
administering copyright as an opt-in system for authors and publishers and 
subsequently also agreed to “restore” copyrights to foreign authors who 
would have received a United States copyright but for their failure to comply 
with these formal requirements.4 The triumphalist narrative views the United 
States’ adoption of these international obligations as an acceptance of a 
deontological approach to copyright requiring a strict formalism in judging 
what counts as a copyright formality and what is permissible under Berne.5  
This formalistic understanding of the anti-formalities obligation under 
Berne article 5(2), as subsequently incorporated into the World Trade 
Organization’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (“TRIPS”),6 aims to shrink the policy space for deploying or 
regulating formal requirements imposed on authors in the exercise or 
enjoyment of their rights under copyright.7 However, this formalist view is 
under pressure as the costs of automatic copyright become more manifest in 
this era of digital networks and increasing globalization.8 A range of scholars 
 
 3. See generally Graeme W. Austin, Symposium: Metamorphosis of Artists’ Rights in the Digital 
Age, 28 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 397 (2005); Irwin Karp, A Future Without Formalities, 13 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 521 (1995); Arthur Levine, The End of Formalities: No More 
Second-Class Copyright Owners, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 553 (1995); Shira Perlmutter, 
Freeing Copyright from Formalities, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 565 (1995).  
 4. See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012) (analyzing and finding constitutional 
copyright restoration in 17 U.S.C. § 104A). 
 5. See sources cited supra note 3; see also Mihály Ficsor, Collective Management of Copyright 
and Related Rights in the Digital, Networked Environment: Voluntary, Presumption-Based, Extended, 
Mandatory, Possible, Inevitable?, in COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED 
RIGHTS 48 (Daniel Gervais ed., Kluwer 2006) (arguing that the anti-formalities provision 
would prohibit a presumptive compulsory license subject to an opt-out provision). 
 6. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
 7. See Ficsor, supra note 5, at 48 (arguing that the anti-formalities provision would 
prohibit a presumptive compulsory license subject to an opt-out provision). 
 8. See, e.g., STEF VAN GOMPEL, FORMALITIES IN COPYRIGHT LAW 1–8 (outlining the 
legal uncertainties and challenges caused by the lack of formalities in the digital age) (Kluwer 
2011); LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 292–93 (Penguin Press 2004) (suggesting that 
copyright owners should have some small burden at least to signal the renewal of their 
protection); Séverine Dusollier, (Re)Introducing Formalities in Copyright as a Strategy for the Public 
Domain, in OPEN CONTENT LICENSING: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 75, 103–05 
(explaining the need for an efficient formality system designed to maximize the commercial 
purpose of copyright) (Lucie Guibault & Christina Angelopoulos eds., 2011); James Gibson, 
Once and Future Copyright, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167, 212–41 (2005) (proposing policy 
changes to help authors protect their work in the digital age through new types of public or 
private formalities); Jane C. Ginsburg, The U.S. Experience with Mandatory Copyright Formalities: 
A Love/Hate Relationship, 33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 311, 317 (2010) (suggesting a policy change 
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and policymakers has begun to explore ways to expand the policy space in 
which to fashion and deploy copyright formalities.9 
This Article joins in the general move in favor of increased public 
formalities, but argues in the tradition of legal realism that this formalist 
overhang has constrained the policy discussion about reintroducing 
formalities more than it should. In doing so, this Article assumes familiarity 
with the debates about legal formalism and legal realism,10 and relies upon 
 
toward formalities for the recordation of title transfers that would help authors more 
securely transfer their work); Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. 
REV. 485, 545–68 (2004) (proposing possible new-style formalities that push back toward a 
utilitarian past without rejecting Berne); see also Maria A. Pallante, Register of Copyrights and 
Director, U.S. Copyright Office, The Curious Case of Copyright Formalities, Keynote 
Address at the Berkeley Technology Law Journal Symposium: Reform(aliz)ing Copyright for 
the Internet Age? (Apr. 18, 2013), in 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1415, 1418 (2013) 
(“Formalities are interesting because, if implemented fairly, they have the capacity to alleviate 
frustrations, incentivize good behavior, and create a more rational administering of the law, 
all of which is good for authors.”); Glushko Samuelson Intellectual Property Law Clinic 
Response to Notice of Inquiry on the Issue of “Orphan Works,” Submitted to the United 
States Copyright Office, Library of Congress, March 24, 2005 at 2–3 (describing connection 
between absence of formalities and presence of orphan works problem), available at 
http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/comments/OW0595-Glushko-Samuelson.pdf 
(last visited June 28, 2013); Katharina de la Durantaye, Finding a Home for Orphans: Google Book 
Search and Orphan Works Law in the United States and Europe, 21 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J 229, 236–37 (2011) (surveying literature on scope of orphan works 
problem). 
 9. See, e.g., Dusollier, supra note 8, at 103–05 (suggesting two-tier approach to 
formalities granting additional benefits to registered works); Gibson, supra note 8, at 212–41 
(proposing policy changes to help authors protect their work in the digital age through new 
types of public or private formalities); Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 317 (suggesting a policy 
change toward formalities for the recordation of title transfers that would help authors more 
securely transfer their work); LESSIG, supra note 8, at 292–93 (suggesting that copyright 
owners should have some small burden at least to signal the renewal of their protection); 
Sprigman, supra note 8, at 545–68 (proposing possible new-style formalities that push back 
toward a utilitarian past without rejecting Berne); VAN GOMPEL, supra note 8, at 288–96 
(suggesting that formalities be reintroduced in regards to copyright owners’ economic 
rights). 
 10. As many readers know, “legal formalism” and “legal realism” are labels used to 
map a variety of jurisprudential approaches to the interpretation and application of law. See 
generally Brian Leiter, Legal Formalism and Legal Realism: What Is The Issue?, 16 LEGAL THEORY 
111 (2010) (providing an overview of the approaches and analysis of some of the 
disagreement surrounding them); see also Steven M. Quevedo, Comment, Formalist and 
Instrumentalist Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 119 (1985) (providing a good 
history of the two approaches). For present purposes, a few simple observations should 
suffice to establish a baseline from which one can measure interpretation and understanding 
of Berne’s anti-formalities provision and formalities themselves as tending more toward 
formalism or realism.  
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the familiar analysis of the public/private distinction11 and the 
formalist/functionalist12 approaches to interpreting and applying law. When 
applied to the present context, the public/private distinction largely obscures 
the numerous privately administered systems of formalities that authors in 
many creative fields comply with and rely upon.13 Formally, Berne and 
 
 11. Legal discourse that distinguishes between “public” and “private” does so in more 
than one way, but the most common is the distinction between governmental and non-
governmental actors, as reflected in the terms “public law” and “private law,” for example. 
See generally Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 
1423 (1982). This version of the distinction has been subject to withering critique. See, e.g., 
Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 
1349, 1357 (1982) (“Following out these lines of similarity and difference, one simply loses 
one’s ability to take the public/private distinction seriously as a description, as an 
explanation, or as a justification of anything.”). Why, for example, should a corporation, 
whose legal “personality” is dependent upon government, be treated as a “private” entity? 
Numerous critical scholars have also demonstrated the ways in which the “private” sphere is 
properly the subject of public policy. See, e.g., Gerald Turkel, The Public/Private Distinction: 
Approaches to the Critique of Legal Ideology, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 801, 802 (1988). 
 12. See generally Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 
COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935) (using, for example, the legal question of the geographic location 
of a corporation for jurisdictional purposes as a question amenable to illustrate the 
approach). Formalist versus functionalist approaches to legal interpretation lead to 
interesting results when applied to the question of what triggers Article 5(2) of the Berne 
Convention and its TRIPS cousin, Article 9.1 (which incorporates almost all of Berne into 
TRIPS). See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, art. 9.1. A formalist approach would apply the 
provision only to public formalities, whereas a functionalist approach might impose liability 
on a member state if within its territory an author would have no practical choice but to 
participate in a system of private formalities to exercise or enjoy her rights economically. See 
VAN GOMPEL, supra note 8, at 206–08. This issue already has arisen with respect to 
compulsory participation in collective management. Id. With respect to the interpretation of 
“exercise” and “enjoyment,” some formalists would treat any formal condition on obtaining, 
licensing, or enforcing rights as a prohibited formality. See, e.g., Actes de la Conférence 
internationale pour la protection des droits d’auteur réunie à Berne du 8 au 19 Septembre 1884 43 (1884), 
discussed in SAM RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND 
NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND ¶ 6.102 (2006) 
(“everything which must be complied with in order to ensure that the rights of the author 
with regard to his work may come into existence.”). Others might rely on a formal 
distinction between rights and remedies and apply the prohibition only to preconditions on 
obtaining or licensing rights. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392 
(2006) (distinguishing between rights and remedies in the context of injunctive relief for 
patent infringement: “the creation of a right is distinct from the provision of remedies for 
violations of that right.”); Christopher Jon Sprigman, Berne’s Vanishing Ban on Formalities, 28 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1565, 1568–73 (2013). A functionalist could well conclude that even if 
subjecting an author’s ability to obtain, license, or enforce rights to a condition was a 
formality, if it were one that were trivially easy to comply with, it would not rise to the level 
of a formality that impairs an author’s ability to exercise or enjoy rights. See infra notes 64–69 
and accompanying text. 
 13. See infra Part III (describing and discussing private formalities). 
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TRIPS, as instruments of public international law, regulate “public” 
formalities enacted through a Member State’s formal lawmaking processes. 
Yet Berne and TRIPS simultaneously leave open space for “private” 
formalities imposed by actors, such as Collective Management Organizations 
(“CMOs”), which rely in part on state power to function.14 Policy discussion 
concerning the role of copyright formalities should not be constrained by 
focusing only on the role of public requirements and public administration, 
but should also take account of the private actors who impose and rely upon 
formal requirements affecting the enjoyment and exercise of copyright.15 
Interestingly, recent developments at the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (“WIPO”) support this argument and demonstrate a realist 
approach to eliding the public/private distinction.16 In support of its thematic 
project on intellectual property and the public domain, WIPO commissioned 
studies covering both public and private formalities systems to provide a 
realistic picture of copyright documentation in the digital environment.17 
As others writing in this volume have previously elaborated, formal 
requirements, such as publication-with-notice, registration, deposit, and 
 
 14. See id. and accompanying text. Throughout the latter nineteenth and the twentieth 
centuries, referring to formal requirements imposed by such private actors as “copyright 
formalities” would have been deemed incoherent because those requirements are on the 
other side of the public/private distinction from the Berne constraint.  
 15. See id. (discussing the role of private formalities).  
 16. The 45 Adopted Recommendations under the WIPO Development Agenda, WORLD 
INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG. (2007), http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-develop 
ment/en/agenda/recommendations.pdf. For example, Cluster A. No. 9 of the Adopted 
Recommendations has brought a measure of legal realism to the organization’s interest in 
copyright formalities. See id.; see also infra notes 39–55 and accompanying text (discussing 
WIPO studies of private copyright documentation services and their interaction with public 
formalities systems). This is welcome news. Specifically, WIPO surveys and studies of 
copyright formalities recognize that private formalities are appropriately within the scope of 
Berne and that the interaction between public formalities and private formalities is a subject 
worthy of attention. See infra notes 39–55 and accompanying text.  
 17. According to WIPO: 
As part of the Development Agenda thematic project on IP and the 
Public Domain a Survey of Private Copyright Documentation Systems 
and Practices: (a) Private Registries (b) Collective Management 
Organization’s Databases, is also under preparation. This would cover the 
use of copyright documentation, including in the form of RMI, by entities 
such as collective management organizations or the Creative Commons 
System, and would examine how these systems identify, or might 
contribute to identifying, content that is protected or in the public 
domain. 
Copyright and Registration, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/
copyright/en/activities/copyright_registration/ (last visited July 27, 2013). 
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renewal or maintenance, serve a variety of functions that align with copyright 
law’s principal economic goal of providing authors, publishers, and their 
investors with potential profits for culturally appealing works.18 In particular, 
formalities require rightsholders to provide potential transacting partners 
with sufficient information to identify the copyright owner so that 
conversations about licensing or acquiring rights may begin.19 Realizing that 
Berne article 5(2) and TRIPS article 9(1) have removed formalities from 
public law, the realist perspective shifts the policy focus to how those subject 
to copyright regulation can create private substitutes for those public 
formalities.20 From this perspective, the space once occupied by a formalities 
system administered by public officials has been privatized rather than 
abandoned.21  
Specifically, this Article argues that public officials have space to improve 
the functioning of formalities in the copyright system in two ways: (1) using 
the available flexibility within the existing international framework to increase 
the role of publicly administered formalities; and (2) recognizing the private 
formalities systems run by CMOs, as well as working to improve 
interoperability and transparency in these systems through a mixture of 
public/private cooperation and public regulation. On both fronts, public 
officials should consider the role of technical standards as a regulatory force 
in both public and private systems of formalities and should work to ensure 
that standards of decision making reflects public values. 
Most of the existing and emergent literature focuses on improving the 
role of publicly-administered formalities,22 so this Article will offer only a few 
recommendations in this regard. Instead, the Article primarily focuses on the 
role and regulation of private formalities and the importance of technical 
standards in minimizing the costs and maximizing the benefits that digital 
technologies offer in the design and implementation of copyright formalities. 
II. REINVIGORATING PUBLIC FORMALITIES 
This Part critiques the formalist narrative about public formalities and 
provides additional support for those who argue that public officials could 
lawfully reintroduce some mandatory public formalities at the national level 
 
 18. See, e.g., VAN GOMPEL, supra note 8, at 15–51. 
 19. See id. at 18–19. 
 20. See, e.g., id. at 206–08. 
 21. Id.; see also Pallante, supra note 8, at 1421 (referring to desirability of making 
recordation in Copyright Office database interoperable with private recordation databases 
administered by collecting societies). 
 22. See sources cited supra note 9.  
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within the constraints of the Berne/TRIPS anti-formalities provisions. The 
formalist narrative largely overlooks the beneficial functions formalities can 
and have performed, even if historically implementations have had some 
shortcomings.23 This narrative also overstates the constraints that a human 
rights construct of authors’ rights would impose on expansion or 
reintroduction of public formalities.24 Relatedly, the formalist interpretation 
of the Berne/TRIPS anti-formalities provisions, as grounded in the human 
rights construct, is at odds with the history at both the national and 
international levels.25 Recent scholarship makes clear that these provisions are 
better understood as reflecting a reaction to the complexities of a patchwork 
of varying national formalities rather than a complete rejection of 
formalities.26 This scholarship also clarifies that the Berne/TRIPS constraints 
are not as far-reaching as has been commonly assumed. In particular, 
opportunities exist to reintroduce public formalities that would take 
advantage of new technologies for streamlining their administration and 
technologies that could help perform a filtering function with respect to 
works published on the Internet.27 Consequently, it is a propitious time for 
public officials to think creatively about how public formalities might be 
expanded, refashioned, or reintroduced to better enable copyright law to 
promote its policy objectives. 
One goal for granting authors copyright, or at least economic rights in 
their works of authorship, is to support a transaction structure in which 
authors have the opportunity to be rewarded for works that have popular 
appeal.28 This transaction structure relies on some of the functions that 
copyright formalities traditionally played in providing notice about the 
identity of the author(s), the work(s), and other information relevant to 
potential parties to a transaction concerning the exclusive rights in the 
 
 23. See Sprigman, supra note 8, at 545–68 (recognizing shortcomings of rigid formalities 
requirements and proposing a more flexible alternative system); Pallante, supra note 8 
(articulating benefits of fairly designed formalities). 
 24. See, e.g., VAN GOMPEL, supra note 8, at 267–80 (demonstrating that personality-
based rights can be, and are, subject to formalities in Europe); see also Sprigman, supra note 8, 
at 543 (“The degree to which formalities are inconsistent with natural rights-based copyright 
is easily overstated.”). 
 25. See infra notes 31–36 and accompanying text.  
 26. See infra note 34.  
 27. Id. 
 28. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters, 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (“In 
our haste to disseminate news, it should not be forgotten that the Framers intended 
copyright itself to be the engine of free expression. By establishing a marketable right to the 
use of one’s expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate 
ideas.”); see also Sprigman, supra note 8, at 523–24, 528 (arguing in part in support of renewed 
formalities to support exchange of transaction-related information).  
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work(s).29 On its own terms, the formalist narrative is thus problematic at its 
core because some kind of notice and registration function is required for 
authors to receive the full economic benefits that copyright is designed to 
supply. Moreover, at least in the United States, the law grants private 
economic benefits to authors in order to achieve a larger, public goal.30 This 
observation alone should put one in a more generous interpretive posture 
concerning the potential to implement public formalities under the 
international framework. 
Two other observations further buttress this point. First, the formalist 
narrative overreads human rights obligations by confusing legal entitlements 
with options to obtain or exercise legal entitlements.31 Human rights law does 
not assert a general principle that prevents a government from treating civil 
and political rights as an option to obtain and exercise rights rather than as a 
grant ab initio in all cases.32 For example, the right to vote is considered 
among the most central political rights that citizens of a democracy possess, 
and yet governments routinely require potential voters to comply with a 
formality—registration—before they may exercise or enjoy this right.33  
Second, the formalistic narrative is at odds with the history of Berne’s 
anti-formalities obligation and how this obligation should be interpreted in 
light of this history. Recent work by Stef van Gompel, Daniel Gervais, and 
others34 demonstrates that the authors of anti-formalities provisions 
 
 29. See, e.g., VAN GOMPEL, supra note 8, at 47–49 (describing the role formalities may 
play in supplying information).  
 30. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (“The 
immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an ‘author’s’ creative 
labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general 
public good.”).  
 31. See Sprigman, supra note 8, at 543 (“The degree to which formalities are 
inconsistent with natural rights-based copyright is easily overstated.”).  
 32. See, e.g., VAN GOMPEL, supra note 8, at 267–80 (demonstrating that personality-
based rights can be, and are, subject to formalities in Europe). 
 33. See Michael W. Carroll, One For All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in Intellectual 
Property Law, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 845, 879 (2006) (elaborating on this point in the context of 
whether legal rights should be treated as entitlements or as real options to acquire 
entitlements). 
 34. See generally VAN GOMPEL, supra note 8; see also Daniel Gervais, The Google Book 
Settlement and the TRIPS Agreement, 2011 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 3–5 (2011); Daniel Gervais, 
The 1909 Copyright Act in International Context, 26 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. 
L.J. 185, 196–202 (2010); Daniel Gervais, Collective Management of Copyright: Theory and Practice 
in the Digital Age, in COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS 24–
27 (Daniel Gervais ed., 2d ed. 2010); Mihály Ficsor, Collective Management of Copyright and 
Related Rights from the Viewpoint of International Norms and the Acquis Communautaire, in 
COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS, supra, at 29–33; 
Laurence R. Helfer, Collective Management of Copyrights and Human Rights: An Uneasy Alliance 
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responded to a situation in which authors and publishers faced overly 
cumbersome copyright formalities, operating in an increasingly international 
market for copyrighted works. Some authors’ rights triumphalists strategically 
downplay or ignore this history.35 However, deploying deontological 
arguments for utilitarian purposes is generally self-defeating.36 Attempts to 
treat the anti-formalities provisions of Berne as recognition of authors’ 
human rights rather than as a situationally pragmatic response to 
administrative difficulties follows this pattern. 
Recent scholarship has built upon the premise that some level of 
formalities is required to support a structure for transactions pertaining to 
exclusive rights in works of authorship, and that the international prohibition 
on certain public formalities as a precondition of the author’s exercise and 
enjoyment of rights is based on pragmatic objections that can be revisited in 
light of changed circumstances.37 This scholarly interest in a more vigorous 
approach to public formalities is welcome because the current system of 
public formalities leaves considerable room for improvement.  
WIPO’s Development Agenda supplies reasons for renewed attention to 
the beneficial functions that public copyright formalities perform. 
Specifically, with regard to registration, these include providing public means 
for: (1) asserting claims of authorship and ownership, (2) identifying works of 
authorship, (3) delimiting the public domain by supplying information 
relevant to the expiration of copyright, and (4) mapping creative activity 
 
Revisited, in COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS, supra, at 75–
87; Stef van Gompel, Les Formalités Sont Mortes, Vive Les Formalités! Copyright Formalities and the 
Reasons for Their Decline in Nineteenth Century Europe, in PRIVILEGE AND PROPERTY: ESSAYS ON 
THE HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT 157, 196–201 (Ronan Deazley et al. eds., 2010). 
 35. See, e.g., Orrin G. Hatch, Better Late Than Never: Implementation of the 1886 Berne 
Convention, 22 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 171, 192–95 (1989) (describing the formality issue as 
esoteric and unnecessary in delaying the United States from joining Berne); Susan Stanton, 
Development of the Berne International Copyright Convention and Implications of United States Adherence, 
13 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 149, 169 (1990) (describing the delay in the passage of Berne due to 
heated debate over formalities).  
 36. See Louis Michael Seidman, Soldiers, Martyrs, and Criminals: Utilitarian Theory and the 
Problem of Crime Control, 94 YALE L.J. 315, 339–40 (1984) (demonstrating contradictions 
inherent in using moral blame as a utilitarian strategy for crime control). 
 37. See, e.g., Sprigman, supra note 8, at 545–46 (explaining that technological innovation 
could make the reintroduction of formalities more feasible); Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 316–
17 (describing types of formalities that can and do still exist under Berne); Gibson, supra note 
8, at 212–41 (discussing need for formalities to balance legal entitlements in copyright law); 
Gervais, The Google Book Settlement and the TRIPS Agreement, supra note 34, at 3–5 (discussing 
the history of anti-formalities regulation in Berne and the extent to which formalities still 
exist in copyright law); VAN GOMPEL, supra note 8, at 193–214 (describing the current use of 
formalities under Berne). 
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within a territory.38 In a survey, WIPO reported that 48 members of the total 
186 member states39 administered voluntary registries within their territory.40 
Finally, these voluntary public formalities systems document only a very 
small fraction of the eligible works of authorship.41 The large majority of 
these systems are administered within the executive branch of government, 
usually by the Ministry of Justice or the Ministry of Culture.42 But, some small 
states, such as Armenia, Mali, Namibia, and Slovenia, delegate administration 
of their “public” system to CMOs or other private entities.43 Also, Italy and 
Japan have hybrid systems.44 Both outsource registration of computer 
programs to private entities, and Italy also delegates registration of 
audiovisual works to a CMO.45 
Further recognizing the coexistence of, and the potential benefits of 
interoperability among, public and private systems, the WIPO survey asked 
whether a member state’s public copyright registry interconnects with any 
other copyright data system.46 In the majority of cases, the answer is “No.”47 
In only two cases, Algeria and Mali, is the public registry interconnected with 
a CMO database.48 Other examples of interconnection involve 
intragovernmental links among ministries.49  
The survey did not ask about interoperability between the public 
registries of member states, although it did inquire whether member states 
 
 38. See Development Agenda for WIPO, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG.,
http://www.wipo.int/ip-development/en/agenda/ (last visited Jun. 29, 2013); see also 
Copyright Registration and Documentation, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., http://www. 
wipo.int/copyright/en/activities/copyright_registration/ (last visited Jun. 29, 2013).  
 39. See Member States, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/
members/en/ (last visited Jun. 29, 2013).  
 40. See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., WIPO SUMMARY OF THE RESPONSES TO 
THE QUESTIONNAIRE FOR SURVEY ON COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION AND DEPOSIT SYSTEMS 
1, available at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/copyright/en/registration/pdf/regis 
tration_summary_responses.pdf. 
 41. See id. at 2–3. For example, in the United States, out of the millions of photographs 
posted to Flickr, and hours of video uploaded to YouTube, only 636,527 works of 
authorship were registered in fiscal year 2010. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, FISCAL ANNUAL 
REPORT 3 (2010), available at http://www.copyright.gov/reports/annual/2010/ar2010.pdf 
(last visited July 18, 2013). 
 42. See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., supra note 40, at 1. 
 43. See id. 
 44. See id. 
 45. See id. 
 46. See id. at 2.  
 47. Id. 
 48. See id. 
 49. See id. 
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would accord legal significance to foreign registrations.50 The survey reveals 
that the possibility of interoperability among public or private digital 
registration databases likely is a long way off. Sixteen member states store 
registration data in hard copy only, including Argentina, Brazil, Italy, and 
South Africa.51 At least five other member states are currently transitioning to 
a digital registration system.52 Even for systems that store digital records, only 
eleven countries enable public access over the Internet.53 Nevertheless, for 
present purposes, the key point is that even on the ostensibly “public” side of 
the formalities ledger, private parties have been delegated the responsibility 
to perform copyright registration.54 
The survey also reveals the vast room for improvement in making even 
voluntary registration systems better perform their function in supporting a 
transaction structure around copyrighted works.55 Greater standardization 
and other measures to promote interconnection and interoperability among 
public and private registration databases would almost certainly improve 
these systems’ overall effectiveness and attractiveness and induce greater 
participation by copyright owners.56  
Recent scholarship also illuminates the opportunities that the 
international framework leaves for reimagining and reinvigorating both 
mandatory and voluntary public formalities. The international framework 
permits a member state to impose mandatory formalities on its own 
nationals.57 As other contributors to this volume persuasively argue, the 
international framework also would permit imposition of mandatory 
formalities on all assignees and transferees of the author’s rights.58 Relatedly, 
formalities to maintain rights under copyright beyond the life-plus-fifty Berne 
minimum also would be permissible.59 Whether mandatory formalities that 
 
 50. See id. at 7. 
 51. Id. at 10. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 11. 
 54. Id. at 1–2. 
 55. See id. at 3–5 (showing that most countries lack ability to register transfer 
agreements, copyright licenses, or security interests). 
 56. See Sprigman, supra note 8, at 545–68 (suggesting need for interoperability across 
copyright and increased formalities). 
 57. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2012) (requiring copyright registration prior to 
commencement of suit for infringement of rights in “any United States work”). 
 58. See, e.g. Stef van Gompel, Copyright Formalities in the Internet Age: Filters of Protection or 
Facilitators of Licensing, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1425, 1453–56 (2013). 
 59. See, e.g., The Public Domain Enhancement Act, H.R. 2601, 108th Cong., at 6, 
reintroduced as H.R. 2408, 109th Cong., at 6 (imposing a small tax as the price to maintain 
copyright protection beyond the Berne minimum); see also The Register’s Call for Updates to U.S. 
Copyright Law: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop., and the Internet of the H. 
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serve as a precondition to the availability of injunctive relief or enhanced 
monetary remedies would not run afoul of Berne because they apply only to 
remedies rather than rights is a more contentious question.60 
The digital challenges and opportunities that fuel some of the renewed 
interest in copyright formalities in general also supply the basis for an 
additional argument concerning mandatory formalities. Digital technologies 
offer opportunities to make affixing notice to a work or registering an 
author’s claim to copyright in a database trivially easy in places with ready 
computer and Internet access.61 Metadata can be preconfigured to 
automatically associate with digital files, such as a document created in 
Microsoft Word, and creating account information in a digital database has 
become a routine precondition for participating in many aspects of digital 
life.62 These technological advances represent a radical change in 
circumstances from those that inspired the amendment to add the Berne 
prohibition in 1908.63 
In other legal contexts, recognition of these changed technological 
circumstances has led to changed legal interpretations. Under traditional legal 
 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of Maria A. Pallante, Register of 
Copyrights of the United States), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/113th/
03202013/Pallante%20032013.pdf (“You may want to consider alleviating some of the 
pressure and gridlock brought about by the long copyright term—for example, by reverting 
works to the public domain after a period of life plus fifty years unless heirs or successors 
register their interests with the Copyright Office.”); van Gompel, supra note 58, at 1444–47 
(2013). 
 60. Compare Sprigman, supra note 8, at 557 (“Nevertheless, authors who fail to comply 
with new-style formalities and thereby lose their previously existing right to exclude are likely 
not, as a category, deprived of any aspect of the ‘enjoyment and exercise’ of the economic 
rights appertaining to their copyright.”), with Jane C. Ginsburg, With Untired Spirits and Formal 
Constancy: Berne-Compatibility of Formal Declaratory Measures to Enhance Title-Searching, 
28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1583, 1593 (2013) (“Berne’s prohibition on formalities requires 
that the basic copyright remedies, such as injunctive relief and actual damages, remain 
available to foreign authors who have not locally registered their works or undertaken other 
locally-imposed declaratory measures.”).  
 61. See generally Randall Farrar, Metadata: The Hidden Disaster That’s Right in Front of You, 
N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N J. 49 (Oct. 2010) (explaining how Microsoft Office automatically 
associates metadata with files and legal implications of this fact in the litigation context), 
available at http://www.esqinc.com/Content/Articles/NYSBA_Metadata_Oct2010.pdf (last 
visited July 18, 2013); see also NATIONAL INFORMATION STANDARDS ORGANIZATION, 
UNDERSTANDING METADATA 1–2 (Niso Press ed., 2004), available at http://www.niso.org/
publications/press/UnderstandingMetadata.pdf (defining metadata and describing its 
potential uses).  
 62. NATIONAL INFORMATION STANDARDS ORGANIZATION, supra note 61, at 1–2 
(defining metadata and describing its potential uses). 
 63. See sources cited supra note 34 (discussing, inter alia, administrative burdens of 
registering in multiple jurisdictions). 
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principles, for example, a person’s inaction usually would not support a 
finding of an implied agreement or an implied license, as is true in copyright 
law.64 However, at least one court found that a web publisher’s choice to 
publish copyrighted works on the Web while forgoing the trivially easy 
formality of using the robots.txt exclusion header in the website’s metadata 
designed to stop search engines from copying the text for purposes of 
indexing and caching the website, formed the basis for finding that the 
publisher had licensed search engines to copy, index, and cache the contents 
of the web site.65 The extended collective licensing scheme adopted in Nordic 
countries has a similar opt-out provision,66 which some have suggested runs 
afoul of Berne article 5(2).67 Professor Daniel Gervais ably rebuts this 
suggestion.68 
By analogy, a dynamic interpretation of the Berne Convention would lead 
to the conclusion that, at least in countries with ready access to computers 
and the Internet, a mandatory notice or registration formality should not be 
read to affect an author’s ability to exercise or enjoy her rights under 
copyright.69 This would be especially true for formalities that affected the 
scope of rights or remedies available to an author based on steps that would 
be trivially easy and commonplace to take in the digital environment.70  
Finally, whether formalities are cast as mandatory or voluntary, recent 
work offers a fresh look at the filtering function that formalities can play.71 
 
 64. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 69, cmt. a (1981) (“Acceptance by 
silence is exceptional. Ordinarily an offeror does not have power to cause the silence of the 
offeree to operate as acceptance.” (emphasis omitted)); see, e.g., William F. Klingensmith, Inc. 
v. District of Columbia, 370 A.2d 1341, 1343 (D.C. 1977) (finding that the defendant’s 
silence in response to a letter for the balance of a contracting job could not constitute a valid 
contract). 
 65. See Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1116 (D. Nev. 2006); cf. Keane 
Dealer Servs. v. Harts, 968 F. Supp. 944, 947 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding that knowledge of, 
and silence in the face of, defendant’s use of software supplied the basis for an implied 
license to use). 
 66. See Thomas Riis & Jens Schovsbo, Extended Collective Licenses and the Nordic 
Experience: It’s a Hybrid but Is It a Volvo or a Lemon?, 33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 471, 474–76 
(2010) (providing an overview of the Nordic extended copyright licensing system). 
 67. Id. at 482–85 (expressing some possible concerns over the interaction between 
Berne and the Nordic model); see also Ficsor, supra note 5, at 48 (arguing that an opt-out 
provision in extended collective licenses is inconsistent with Berne Art. 5(2)). 
 68. See Gervais, Collective Management of Copyright: Theory and Practice in the Digital Age, supra 
note 34, at 24–27 (arguing that not all mandatory formalities are illegal under Berne); accord 
VAN GOMPEL, supra note 8, at 209–11 (concluding that opt-out models from statutory 
licenses are not prohibited formalities). 
 69. Thanks to my colleague Peter Jaszi for this suggestion. 
 70. Id. 
 71. In Kahle v. Gonzales, the Ninth Circuit held that: 
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Traditionally, failure to adhere to formalities resulted in forfeiture of 
copyright.72 However, public formalities in the United States already filter the 
remedies available to owners of copyright in United States works,73 and this 
approach could be applied creatively to include scope as well. 
A more nuanced approach to the filtering function would be especially 
valuable, as automatic copyright in the digital world has led to a continuous 
and growing eruption of copyrights.74 A useful place to start in this analysis is 
the report of the Copyright Principles Project, which suggests ways in which 
scope and remedies might be tailored based on whether rightsholders choose 
to register their claims to copyright in an updated digital registry.75 With a 
system for easy registration in place, a creator’s choice to not register would 
have consequences. Specifically, the report imagines formalities that would 
tier protection such that the scope of copyright in unregistered works could 
be limited to a prohibition against exact or near-exact copying that causes 
commercial harm.76 Other uses would likely be deemed fair. Remedies for 
infringement involving unregistered works would not include statutory 
damages or attorneys’ fees.77 In contrast, registration would likely provide 
rights of a broader scope, including the rights to exclude copying of 
nonliteral elements of a work of authorship and to stop some of the 
noncommercial uses likely to have market-impairing effects.78 The right to 
terminate a transfer of copyright after some period of years also could be 
limited to owners of copyright in registered works.79 A copyright owner 
 
Renewal served as a filter that passed certain works—mostly those 
without commercial value—into the public domain. Along with 
formalities such as registration and notice (which have also been 
effectively eliminated), renewal requirements created an “opt-in” system 
of copyright in which protections were only available to those who 
affirmatively acted to secure them. 
Kahle v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 697, 699 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 72. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 328–32. 
 73. See 17 U.S.C. § 412 (2012). 
 74. See Pamela Samuelson et al., The Copyright Principles Project: Directions for Reform, 25 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1175, 1186 (2010): 
The move to an automatic protection regime puts current law in tension 
with the principle that there should be reasonable ways for the public to 
get information about who owns which rights in which works and 
whether works are or are not available for use or are in the public domain. 
Id. By way of full disclosure, this Author was a member of the Copyright Principles Project. 
 75. See generally id.  
 76. Id. at 1200. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 1200–01. 
 79. Id. at 1201. 
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could register at any time, but the benefits of registration would not be 
retroactive.80 
The emergent debate on reintroducing or enhancing public formalities is 
welcome. Advances in digital technologies are both the source of many 
problems associated with a lack of formalities as well as the potential source 
of solutions. In the modern context, public formalities could be designed to 
avoid the overly harsh consequences visited upon a small number of 
copyright owners under the historical all-or-nothing approach.81 Instead, 
notice and registration, and potentially recordation, deposit, or maintenance 
could all be accomplished for digital works with very little trouble for the 
rights owner.  
New style formalities could be flexible in numerous ways, including being 
limited to works in digital form and not applying to authors in territories that 
currently lack ready and reliable access to the Internet. New style formalities 
would reclaim the public function of gathering and sharing information 
about creative works, enhancing productive transactions that benefit creators 
and audiences alike. Importantly, new style public formalities should be 
fashioned to interoperate with, and to improve the transparency of, the 
systems of private formalities discussed in the next Part. Interoperability 
would require agreements on common technical standards and on the type of 
information public registries should provide, compared to the information 
that should be treated as too commercially sensitive to be made public. One 
design would treat the public deposit/registry as the base layer of 
information, which could then be extended for use in private formalities 
systems, such as CMOs.  
III. REGULATING PRIVATE FORMALITIES  
The authors’ rights narrative about formalities overlooks the fact that the 
banishment of mandatory public formalities in the Berne Union in the early 
twentieth century coincided with the emergence of CMOs.82 These CMOs 
brought with them privately-administered formal requirements for authors to 
supply relevant information as a condition of receiving a share of the 
economic rewards administered by the CMO. Thus, it would be better to 
understand the death-of-formalities story less as a philosophical victory for 
 
 80. Id. 
 81. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 328–32 (discussing the historical all-or-nothing 
approach to copyright). 
 82. See Gervais, Collective Management of Copyright: Theory and Practice in the Digital Age, 
supra note 34, at 3–10 (providing the evolution of and process used by CMOs). 
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authors’ rights and more as a privatization or outsourcing story about 
administering a system of copyright formalities. 
From this perspective, the theme of reform(aliz)ing copyright means that 
current public policy must reclaim an increased role in establishing, 
administering, or regulating new and existing systems of copyright 
formalities. Work done in this vein draws attention to the privately 
administered formalities and their interaction with publicly administered 
systems and what a “highly asymmetric international scenario” this interplay 
created.83 For example, one project in support of the Development Agenda 
at the World Intellectual Property Organization84 illustrates the policy 
opportunity of using public and private copyright formalities to promote 
access to “orphan” works and works in copyright’s public domain.85 
Recognizing that privately administered formalities systems occupy much of 
the field, policymakers should focus their attention on the degree to which 
these systems are interoperable, transparent, and effective. 
Until recently, these private systems had been subject to little or no 
public oversight.86 This lack of oversight is beginning to change, particularly 
with respect to the transparency of CMOs.87 Public officials can and should 
do more to ensure better integration between public and private formalities 
systems and to ensure that these systems operate to serve the ultimate public 
interest that copyright law aims to promote. This Part maps these private 
 
 83. See Copyright Registration and Documentation, supra note 38 (describing studies of public 
and private registration and documentation systems as part of work under the Development 
Agenda Thematic Project on Intellectual Property and the Public Domain). 
 84. The WIPO Development Agenda refers to a package of forty-five proposals 
adopted by the WIPO General Assembly in 2007. See Development Agenda for WIPO, supra 
note 38; see also Copyright Registration and Documentation, supra note 38. 
 85. See Development Agenda for WIPO, supra note 38; see also Copyright Registration and 
Documentation, supra note 38. 
 86. See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights and Multi-Territorial Licensing of 
Rights in Musical Works for Online Uses in the Internal Market, Article 18, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/management/com-2012-3722_en.pdf 
(proposing greater transparency and oversight of CMOs); see also Anne-Catherine Lorrain, 
EU Presidency Proposes Compromise on Draft Directive on Collective Management of Copyright, 
COMMUNIA (May 22, 2013), http://www.communia-association.org/2013/05/22/eu-presi 
dency-proposes-compromise-on-draft-directive-on-collective-management-of-copyright 
(analyzing the transparency issues in the directive and offering suggestions); Gervais, 
Collective Management in Theory and Practice in the Digital Age, supra note 34, at 14–18. 
 87. See Tanya M. Woods, Working Toward Spontaneous Copyright Licensing: A Simple Solution 
for a Complex Problem, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1141, 1155–57 (2009) (claiming the 
Santiago agreement that required CMOs to report certain information was a “step in the 
right direction, [even though] it was plagued by complex practical and legal problems”). 
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formalities systems and then outlines a public policy strategy for improving 
their operation within the larger copyright economy. 
A. A REVIEW OF PRIVATE FORMALITIES SYSTEMS 
Privately-administered formalities systems are heterogeneous but fall 
roughly into three groups: (1) registries and related systems administered by 
organizations that either own rights under copyright or related rights or, 
more often, act as transactional agents for rightsholders; (2) third-party 
registries or copyright documentation services that do not solely rely upon 
input from rightsholders to gather and organize information about works of 
authorship and their rightsholders (e.g., YouTube’s Content ID registry); and 
(3) organizations that compete directly with public formalities systems to 
provide rightsholders with copyright documentation services, such as notice 
(e.g., watermarking), registration, or deposit. 
1. Formalities Administered in Support of  Rightsholder Representation 
The longstanding and, until recently, most economically significant 
systems of private formalities are those administered by CMOs. These CMOs 
have legal authority to grant licenses or collect royalties on behalf of authors 
or other rightsholders.88 While one could argue that the Venetian guilds or 
the Company of Stationers were the original collective management 
organizations, these groups as authors’ collectives originated in France in the 
18th century.89  
Authors generally have a choice about whether to register with a CMO, 
although in some countries, membership is mandatory.90 To become part of 
the CMO’s registry and receive royalties collected by the CMO, an author 
must supply identification and contact information at a very minimum.91 The 
author may supply information about the works submitted to the CMO’s 
repertory, or CMO employees may independently gather that information.92 
The CMO then matches this data with usage data to compensate 
rightsholders.93  
 
 88. See Gervais, Collective Management of Copyright: Theory and Practice in the Digital Age, 
supra note 34, at 6–10.  
 89. See id. 
 90. See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., supra note 40, at 1. 
 91. See Gervais, Collective Management of Copyright: Theory and Practice in the Digital Age, 
supra note 34, at 8.  
 92. Id. 
 93. See id. (“From an operational standpoint, CMOs are essentially data collecting and 
processing entities.”). 
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Representing rights in a repertory of works, CMOs usually operate 
territorially and hold less than the full set of exclusive rights in a particular 
work of authorship.94 As a result, within a specific territory, more than one 
CMO may have an interest in a particular work of authorship, and this is 
certainly true across territories.95 CMOs then engage in cross-border 
cooperation through reciprocal representation agreements96 and by federating 
in umbrella organizations. The largest of these umbrella organizations are (1) 
the International Confederation of Societies of Authors and Composers 
(“CISAC”), which federates 231 CMOs in 121 countries to represent the 
interests of over three million creators and rightsholders,97 and (2) the 
International Federation of Reproduction Rights Organisations (“IFRRO”).98 
These organizations’ private formalities systems support a substantial 
transaction structure. In 2010, CISAC member organizations collected €7.545 
billion, the bulk of which derived from licensing of public performance 
rights.99 Unlike some of the public formalities systems described in Part II, 
CISAC members invested considerable energy in using digital technology to 
improve the exchange of transaction-related information among member 
organizations. In a report to WIPO, a CISAC consultant detailed CISAC’s 
adoption of technical standards for identifying authors, rightsholders, works 
of authorship, and related transaction-relevant data to automate exchanges of 
information among member organizations.100 As a result, CISAC developed 
CIS-net, the product of a ten-year development cycle to improve 
 
 94. See id. at 6–8; see also Séverine Dusollier & Caroline Colin, Peer-to-Peer File Sharing and 
Copyright: What Could be the Role of Collective Management?, 34 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 809, 818–20 
(2011) (outlining the limits and different types of CMOs); Enrico Bonadio, Collective 
Management of Music Copyright in the Internet Age and the EU Initiatives: From Reciprocal 
Representation Agreements to Open Platforms, in WORLD LIBRARY AND INFORMATION 
CONGRESS: 78TH IFLA GENERAL CONFERENCE AND ASSEMBLY 2–3 (2012) (discussing 
collective licensing in the international music industry). 
 95. See Gervais, Collective Management of Copyright: Theory and Practice in the Digital Age, 
supra note 34, at 6–8. 
 96. Id. at 7. 
 97. CISAC, http://www.cisac.org (last visited July 9, 2013). 
 98. INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF REPRODUCTION RIGHTS ORGANISATIONS, 
http://www.ifrro.org (last visited July 9, 2013). 
 99. CISAC, ANNUAL REPORT 2011/12, at 9 (2012), available at http://www.cisac.org/
CisacPortal/initConsultDoc.do?idDoc=23787. 
 100. See FRAÇOIS XAVIER NUTTALL, PRIVATE COPYRIGHT DOCUMENTATION SYSTEMS 
AND PRACTICES: COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATIONS’ DATABASES (PRELIMINARY 
VERSION) (2011), available at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/meetings/en/2011/
wipo_cr_doc_ge_11/pdf/collective.pdf.  
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standardization and interoperability among the member organizations’ 
respective private formalities systems.101  
This standards development activity took place without any significant 
coordination with the administrators of public formalities’ system or other 
parallel standards developments by other private administrators of formalities 
systems.102 For example, a common problem for all formalities systems is 
determining how to disambiguate parties that have the same or very similar 
names. Rather than adopt a single standard across platforms to solve this 
problem, the developers of CIS-net chose one solution,103 while the ORCID 
project for disambiguating the identities of research authors adopted a 
different one.104 Luckily, both CIS-net and ORCID use open protocols that 
enable interoperability,105 but at the price of additional processing that 
possibly could have been avoided. The deeper point here is that the natural 
default position for administrators of private formalities systems is to fashion 
their own solutions to common problems rather than absorb the costs of 
coordinating with administrators in ostensibly unrelated domains. Whether 
this approach is in the public interest with respect to the overall functioning 
of copyright’s transaction structure is a question that deserves attention from 
public officials. 
 
 101. Nuttall states: 
In 2000 a number of Author’s Societies had created “FastTrack”, a 
technical alliance aimed at creating a network connecting the key 
documentation nodes to improve data flow and information exchange. In 
2005, FastTrack GDDN (Global Documentation and Distribution 
Network) was expanded to all CISAC members and was renamed “CIS-
Net powered by FastTrack”. CIS-Net is now the backbone of all Musical 
Works Documentation exchange. 
Id. at 30. 
 102. See id. (demonstrating development of CIS-Net done without coordination with 
administrators of public formalities systems). 
 103. See id. at 31–32 (discussing CIS-net’s use of Interest Party Information database and 
Common Search Index to provide unique codes). 
 104. See What is ORCID?, ORCID, http://orcid.org/content/initiative (last visited July 
27, 2013) (“ORCID is an open, non-profit, community-driven effort to create and maintain 
a registry of unique researcher identifiers and a transparent method of linking research 
activities and outputs to these identifiers.”). 
 105. See NUTTALL, supra note 100, at 8–9; ORCID Open Source Project Now Available!, 
ORCID, https://orcid.org/blog/2013/02/21/orcid-open-source (Mar. 2, 2013, 12:19 AM) 
(explaining choice to release source code openly to improve interoperability with external 
services). 
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2. Third-Party Depositories and Registries: A YouTube Case Study 
Many discussions of copyright formalities share the implicit premise that 
the author or rightsholder must supply information or take certain actions to 
comply with the formalities. Some examples of hybrids have emerged that 
rely on some input from a rightsholder in addition to data generated by the 
administrator of the private formalities system. 
The most economically significant version of this phenomenon is 
Google’s Content ID system, used by YouTube for both enforcement- and 
transaction-related activities.106 Rightsholders supply reference files (deposit), 
metadata about those files (registration), and policies on what they want 
YouTube to do if it finds a match between the reference file and a user-
uploaded file (recordation, at least for policies that allow for licensing).107  
YouTube creates a “hash,” a unique digital identifier, for each reference 
file and then runs uploaded videos through an algorithm that looks to match 
the data pattern encoded in the hash with the data in the uploaded file.108 
According to YouTube’s website, Content ID’s database has more than 
fifteen million reference files that are matched against the more than 250 
years of video that Content ID scans every day.109 More than one third of 
YouTube’s “monetized views” derive from Content ID matches.110 
Although this Article has focused on the role of registries in a formalities 
system, notice and deposit are also functions that private formalities systems 
perform. YouTube is a depository both through its Content ID program and 
also as place for rightsholders to make their content available. Although there 
are other options for sharing video over the Internet, YouTube’s huge 
audience arguably makes it necessary for certain authors or rightsholders to 
deposit a copy of their audiovisual works in order to meaningfully enjoy or 
exercise their rights under copyright. In addition, the Content ID hash 
functions as a form of automated notice. Although YouTube currently uses 
the Content ID hash internally,111 such automated notice potentially could be 
used or relied upon by other parties if this data were publicly available. 
 
 106. See Content ID, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/t/contentid (last visited Jun. 
26, 2013) [hereinafter Content ID]. 
 107. Id.  
 108. See id. (explaining how Content ID functions). 
 109. Statistics, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/yt/press/statistics.html (last visited 
July 8, 2013). 
 110. History of Content Management, YOUTUBE5YEAR, https://sites.google.com/a/
pressatgoogle.com/youtube5year/home/history-of-copyright (providing statistics on fifth 
anniversary of Content ID’s usage) (May 2010). 
 111. Content ID, supra note 106. 
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The Content ID registry functions as part of a private formalities system 
insofar as YouTube offers rightsholders the opportunity to take the formal 
step of contacting YouTube, supplying identity and contact data, and 
entering into a compensation agreement with YouTube.112 This formal step is 
a necessary precondition for a rightsholder to participate in revenues 
generated by certain uses of Content ID. 
It is possible that other advertising-dependent platforms that rely on 
user-generated content, such as Pinterest, would also have an interest in 
developing content registries like YouTube for similar purposes. It is also 
likely that these developments will take place without any appreciable 
coordination with, or oversight by, public officials, including the 
administrators of public formalities systems. Rightsholders should expect 
that additional third parties, like YouTube, will use these digital technologies 
to generate databases of works of authorship and any interested parties. 
Those third parties will not require, and will likely not even seek, rightsholder 
participation. Furthermore, rightsholders can also expect that a formal step 
will be required for them to receive the benefit of the revenues generated by 
these databases. This procedure has been used to generate third party social 
network databases, and there is no reason to think that the same techniques 
could not be used to create copyright databases.113  
3. Private Registries 
Finally, a number of private companies perceive a gap in the market for 
voluntary registration and deposit services.114 As the WIPO-sponsored survey 
of public formalities’ systems demonstrates, a number of countries do not 
offer publicly-administered registration services, and only a small portion of 
those countries make their records available over the Internet.115 Seeking to 
compete directly with or complement public voluntary systems, these 
primarily digital services fill gaps in the public systems by accepting deposits 
from any territory, in multiple formats, at prices that allow user-generated 
 
 112. Id. 
 113. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, A Database of Names, and How They Connect, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 12, 2013, at B1. 
 114. See MARCO RICOLFI ET AL., SURVEY OF PRIVATE COPYRIGHT DOCUMENTATION 
SYSTEMS AND PRACTICES 4–7 (2011), available at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/
meetings/en/2011/wipo_cr_doc_ge_11/pdf/survey_private_crdocystems.pdf (describing 
WIPO study focusing on the emergence of such services in response to perceived gap in the 
market). 
 115. See supra notes 40–55 and accompanying text (describing lack of digital and network 
capacity for most public formalities systems). 
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works to be registered.116 They also use digital technologies, including hashes, 
to identify rightsholders and works.117 
WIPO commissioned a survey of these private documentation services to 
map the current state of this emerging market.118 The survey found that a 
range of general purpose registries have entered the market.119 Some of the 
general purpose registries target users of Creative Commons licenses,120 who 
may find registration useful to support the attribution requirement in such 
licenses.121 Other general-purpose registry targets include domain-specific 
services such as the Writers Guild of America, West Registry.122  
Because the law in many countries gives evidentiary or other legal effect 
to participation in public formalities systems,123 private systems remain at a 
competitive disadvantage with respect to certain classes of rightsholders. 
Nonetheless, the continued proliferation of these services suggests that there 
is sufficient perceived latent demand such that these systems are likely to 
persist. Although some level of competition, even standards competition, 
may be desirable at this point in the digital era, this competition led to a 
situation in which fragmented, uninteroperable private formalities systems 
fail to provide many of the public benefits that could be achieved through 
greater interoperability and transparency.124 
 
 116. See RICOLFI ET AL., supra note 114, at 18–21 (describing competitive strategies of 
private registries).  
 117. See id. 
 118. Id.  
 119. Id. at 18–23 (describing general purpose private registries). 
 120. By way of full disclosure, this Author is a Member of the Creative Commons 
Board. 
 121. RICOLFI ET AL., supra note 114, at 21–22.  
 122. Id. at 23–24; see generally Catherine Fisk, The Role of Private Intellectual Property Rights in 
Markets for Labor and Ideas: Screen Credit and the Writers Guild of America, 1938-2000, 32 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 215, 267–74 (2011) (explaining and providing the reasons for 
the screenwriter’s copyright registry).  
 123. See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., supra note 40, at 5; see also RICOLFI ET AL., 
supra note 114, at 41–43 (noting statutory advantages that voluntary public formalities 
systems enjoy over private documentation systems). 
 124. RICOLFI ET AL., supra note 114, at 18. Ricolfi states: 
As a matter of fact, it is difficult for users to search more than a single 
copyright registry at once and the number of searches to exclude that a 
work has been registered somewhere grows with the number of registries. 
Moreover, the research performed for this study clearly demonstrated that 
even just finding the registries themselves could be challenging, 
particularly if one tried to find all of them and not just the most popular 
ones. Hence, registry fragmentation generates additional costs for users. 
Id. 
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B. PROPOSED GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSES   
This survey of private formalities demonstrates that Berne Article 5(2)’s 
prohibition did not remove formal requirements for authors to exercise or 
enjoy their rights under copyright altogether, but rather reallocated these 
formalities to the private sector. This shift in perspective supports greater 
engagement with systems of private formalities by public officials to ensure 
that the ultimate public policy objectives of copyright law are being served by 
these private formalities. 
Engagement by public officials should be wide-ranging. It should include 
some formal regulation, as well as the use of the government’s convening 
authority. The convening authority could focus attention on finding common 
solutions to common problems and could induce participation in voluntary 
public-private partnerships to increase interoperability between public and 
private formalities systems.125 To serve the overall goals of formalities in the 
copyright economy, public officials should focus their efforts on improving 
the effectiveness of formalities in two ways. First, they should encourage 
socially beneficial transactions concerning works of authorship, both 
commercial and non-commercial. Second, they should seek to reduce 
frictions caused by automatic, long-lasting copyrights, either by filtering some 
works out of the system altogether or by reducing the social costs of 
copyrights whose rightsholders have little or no interest in using 
productively.  
This goal of improving effectiveness in formalities can best be achieved 
by increasing interoperability among formalities systems and by increasing 
their transparency. Transparency has two meanings here. One meaning is to 
make public much of the information held by private formalities systems. 
The second meaning is to increase the accountability of the internal operating 
procedures of those who administer private formalities systems.126 These 
 
 125. This approach has more general support in the United States. See, e.g., Aneesh 
Chopra & Patrick Gallagher, Public-Private Standards Efforts to Make America Strong, OFFICE OF 
SCI. AND TECH. POL’Y, WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 31, 2012, 3:12 PM), http://www.white 
house.gov/blog/2012/01/31/public-private-standards-efforts-make-america-strong (“The 
Administration recognizes the importance of the Federal Government working with the 
private sector to address common standards-related needs and taking on a convening or 
active-engagement role when necessary to ensure a rapid, coherent response to national 
challenges.”). 
 126. See, e.g., Greater Supervision on Collecting Societies as from 1 July 2013, GOV’T OF THE 
NETHERLANDS (June 3, 2013), http://www.government.nl/news/2013/03/06/greater-
supervision-on-collecting-societies-as-from-1-july-2013.html (describing new Dutch law 
requiring collecting societies to publicly disclose “the fees, licence conditions, discount 
schemes, management costs and additional positions of [their] managers”). 
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subsidiary goals aim to supply informational liquidity to the market for 
transactions related to copyright-protected works. They also should increase 
administrative efficiency, providing more value to be shared between 
producers and users of these works. 
While promoting interoperability, public officials should seek to 
encourage innovation in the use of digital technologies to improve the 
functioning of copyright formalities systems. Using its convening authority, 
the government could bring together the most forward-thinking 
administrators to identify standards that best perform the functions a 
formalities system requires. A great deal of creative thought and energy has 
gone into creating the CIS-net and the private general purpose registries, for 
example, and a public convening could be used to evaluate whether these 
standards generalize for other uses. Where standardization is too difficult to 
achieve, public officials should seriously consider the use of regulatory 
authority to require or strongly encourage that competing standards be 
bridged to achieve interoperability. 
In a similar vein, public officials should seek to enter into partnerships 
with administrators of private formalities systems to achieve interoperability 
between public and private formalities systems. On this point, the concept of 
extensibility is essential. The function of public formalities systems is likely 
more limited than that of many of the private systems. It would make sense 
for public systems to provide a base layer of information that could then be 
readily extended to include additional metadata about works of authorship, 
authors, rightsholders, and others with a legally cognizable interest in works 
of authorship. 
Regulation, however, cannot be avoided. The practices of CMOs require 
greater public oversight.127 Some of the more problematic issues do not 
always involve CMOs’ functions as administrators of private formalities 
systems, but even when problems derive primarily from agency disloyalty, 
these are often aided and abetted by the absence of interoperability and 
 
 127. See, e.g., Lucie Guibault & Stef van Gompel, Collective Management in the European 
Union, in COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS, supra note 34, 
at 165–67. Guibalt and van Gompel state: 
In summary, the collective management of rights at the European level is 
in a state of chaos. Instead of cooperating through bilateral agreements to 
optimize the licensing of copyright at the international level, as they 
previously did, national CMOs in Europe are currently involved in 
litigation to prevent each other from issuing pan-European licenses of 
their respective repertoires. 
Id. 
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transparency in the administration of the private formalities system.128 Public 
officials already have begun to respond. The European Commission 
proposed a draft Directive that would regulate CMOs that administer rights 
in musical works.129 More could be done to make the data held in CMOs’ 
private formalities systems more publicly available. In sum, once it is 
recognized that formalities are alive and well in the copyright system through 
these systems of private formalities, a range of reasonable public responses as 
described above follows. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Building on the emerging literature concerning a reformalization of 
copyright law, this Article’s main goal is to suggest that the theme of 
reformalizing copyright should be seen as an effort to reclaim formalities 
from exclusive private control. This would enable formalities to better serve 
copyright’s public purpose to provide public benefits rather than resurrect 
copyright rules interred by the Berne Convention (as of 1908) and the TRIPS 
Agreement. Private formalities have their place, and in the digital 
environment, reinvigorated and reimagined public formalities should be 
designed to interoperate with systems of private formalities. Finally, this 
Article also offers additional support for those who argue that the constraints 
imposed by article 5(2) of the Berne Convention and its incorporation into 
the TRIPS Agreement via article 9(1) leave room for national governments to 
be far more creative in the use of formalities, certainly with respect to 
domestic authors and transferees of all nationalities. 
 
  
 
 128. See generally Jonathan Band, Cautionary Tales About Collective Rights Organizations (Sept. 
19, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2149036 (providing examples of how CMOs 
have been mismanaged and lacked transparency). 
 129. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Collective 
Management of Copyright and Related Rights and Multi-Territorial Licensing of Rights in Musical Works 
for Online Uses in the Internal Market, COM (2012) 372 final (Nov. 7, 2012), available at http://
ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/management/com-2012-3722_en.pdf. 
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